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I. INTRODUCTION
What is the purpose of a "Restatement" of law? While simply
repeating the holdings from judicial decisions in outline form might
be useful to students studying for exams, such an exercise hardly
demands the attention lavished on the production of a Restatement.
For traditional common law topics encrusted by a multiplicity of
judicial decisions from numerous jurisdictions, a Restatement can
serve to clarify the unruly mess. When dealing, however, with
decisions from a single relevant jurisdiction, whose highest court has
recently spoken, are the drafters of a Restatement limited simply to

* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
449

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

450

[55:449

repeating holdings, or can they take a more proactive approach?
This was the problem facing the drafters of the Fourth
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law when addressing the
extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes. Like a fickle fan the
Fourth Restatement brings back the presumption against such
2
extraterritoriality,' which the Second Restatement contained, but the
Third had abandoned. 3 The drafters explain that they are just
following the Supreme Court's off-again, on-again infatuation with
the presumption.4 Yet, even if black-letter adherence to the
presumption against extraterritoriality inevitably results from the
nature of a Restatement, could the drafters have gone further than
they did in addressing the various questions raised by the
presumption? After all, what is the point of the exercise if not to
suggest answers to the difficult open questions?
This article explores in two parts the Fourth's Restatement's
effort to address the presumption against extraterritoriality. Part I
briefly describes the presumption and sketches the Fourth
Restatement's somewhat two-minded approach to incorporating the
presumption within the broader topic of prescriptive jurisdiction. Part
II then examines the limited guidance provided by the Fourth
Restatement with regard to the issues raised in applying this
presumption. We will see that the Fourth Restatement passed on a
number of opportunities for a more proactive role in providing useful
guidance, the result of which will be to limit the impact of the Fourth
Restatement on the topic of prescriptive jurisdiction. This part will
also comment on a couple of areas in which the Fourth Restatement
took a more proactive approach.
II. THE PRESUMPTION AND THE RESTATEMENT

A. The Supreme Court's Off-Again, On-Again Affair with the
PresumptionAgainst Extraterritoriality
In a simpler time, issues of applying United States law beyond
5
the young nation's borders arose on ships and involved pirates,
1.

§ 404

RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

(AM. LAW INST. 2018).
2.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 38

(AM. LAW INST. 1965).
3. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES at § 404 Reporters' Note 13.

4. Id
5.

E.g., United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. 144 (1820).
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murder at sea, and customs duties.7 By the twentieth century, issues
increasingly arose regarding the degree to which modem regulatory
statutes enacted by a powerful United States applied to events that
occurred in other nations. U.S. courts responded with decisions
applying or refusing to apply U.S. antitrust laws,8 employment laws, 9
securities laws,' 0 trademark laws," as well as a variety of other
laws,12 to activities abroad.
In the course of deciding these cases, the Supreme Court often
referred to rules of construction or presumptions regarding Congress's
intent with respect to applying U.S. laws to events beyond the
nation's borders. In its early decisions dealing with murder at sea and
enforcing customs duties, the Supreme Court explained that even
though a statute used broad, general language regarding its reach, the
Court presumed that Congress only intended to legislate within
Congress's "authority and jurisdiction."l 3 While this probably only
referred to the limits imposed by international law on the permissible
reach of a nation's statutes, 14 Justice Holmes' opinion in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 5 advanced the broader proposition
that the legality of an act nearly universally depends upon the law of
the nation in which the act takes place, which, in turn, leads courts to
construe statutes to apply solely within the nation's territorial limits.' 6
This view eventually came to be known as the presumption against
extraterritoriality.

6. E.g., United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. 184 (1820).
7. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 368-69 (1824).
8 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),
148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
9
See Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598, 617-27 (1990) (discussing
cases dealing with extraterritorial application of U.S. employment law).
10. E.g., Morrison v. Austl. Nat'l Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (reversing the approach of
earlier lower court decisions dealing with the reach of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act).
11. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
12. E.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993) (involving the Federal Torts
Claim Act); Turley, supra note 9, at 627-34 (discussing cases dealing with extraterritorial
application of U.S. environmental protection laws).
13. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824).
14. E.g., John H. Knox, A PresumptionAgainst Extrajurisdictionality,104 AM. J. INT'L
L. 351, 363-66 (2010).
15 13 U.S. 347 (1909).
16. Id. at 359.
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The eight decades following American Banana saw deceasing
invocation of the presumption by the Supreme Court, 17 including in
the very field (antitrust) in which American Banana arose." In 1991
the tide turned again, however, when, in EEOC v. Arabian American
Oil Co. (ARAMCO),' 9 the Supreme Court invoked the presumption
against extraterritoriality to hold that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act did not apply to the discriminatory firing of an
American citizen by an American company when the firing took place
in Saudi Arabia. Since ARAMCO, the presumption has found
increasing favor in the Supreme Court's eyes. 20 This includes the
pivotal decision in Morrison v. Australia National Bank, 2 1 in which
the Court went beyond the cases in which all of the seemingly
relevant events occurred abroad and applied the presumption despite
some potentially relevant conduct occurring in the United States.
B. Fittingthe PresumptionAgainst Extraterritorialityinto the
Restatement's Approach to PrescriptiveJurisdiction
The oddly named Second Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law-there is no First Restatement on the topic-contained a section
(Section 38) setting forth the presumption against extraterritoriality.
The Third Restatement dropped explicit reference to the presumption,
but the Fourth Restatement, in Section 404, once again includes it
among the black-letter rules. The drafters of the Fourth Restatement
blame this changing adherence on the Supreme Court's off-again, onagain invocation of the doctrine. 22 The difficulty created by the
presumption against extraterritoriality for the Restatement runs
deeper, however. It also reflects the uncertain scope of the topic of
"Foreign Relations Law" and an unacknowledged tension between the

17 William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,16
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 91 (1998) (explaining how the Supreme Court did not invoke the
presumption against extraterritoriality in the four decades after applying it to the Eight Hour
Law in 1949, even though it had opportunities to do so).
I8 E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); United States v. Sisal
Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148
F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
19. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
20. E.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (holding that the
Alien Tort Statute does not reach conduct inside other nations); RJR Nabisco v. European
Cmty, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (refusing to apply the private cause of action section of RICO to
injuries incurred outside of the United States).
21. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
22. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (AM LAW INST. 2018).
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Restatement's overall approach to prescriptive jurisdiction and the
presumption.
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law follows a typology,
which divides the subject of jurisdiction into jurisdiction to adjudicate
(jurisdiction to hear a matter in a nation's courts), jurisdiction to
enforce (jurisdiction of a nation to take action against a person or
property), and, of present concern, jurisdiction to prescribe
(jurisdiction to apply a nation's law).2 3 The Restatement then employs
a further typology listing various bases upon which a nation might
claim prescriptive jurisdiction (in other words apply its law). Several
of these bases look to territory, either in which the person or property
whose status the law seeks to replate is found, 4 the conduct that the
law seeks to regulate occurred, or the effect of such conduct was
felt. 2 6 A couple of bases look to persons, either the nationality of the
person whose conduct or status the law seeks to regulate 2 ' or the
nationality of the victim of the conduct the law seeks to regulate.2 8
Another basis looks to threats to a nation's security or other critical
interests,

29

while a final basis lies in the view that certain crimes (e.g.,

piracy) call for any nation to prosecute. 30 While there has been some
evolution with respect to one or two of these bases in going from the
Second to the Fourth Restatement, 3 1 the overarching message is that
all of these bases for prescriptive jurisdiction are both employed in
various U.S. laws 32 and allowable under customary international
law. 33
Having laid out an inclusive approach to the bases under which
the U.S. can and does assert prescriptive jurisdiction, another section
in the Second and Fourth Restatements sets out a presumption against

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at §101.
at § 402(1)(a).
at § 402(1)(b).
at § 402(1)(c).
at § 402(1)(d).
at § 402(1)(e).
at § 402(1)(f).

Compare RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES at § 402(1)(d) (recognizing prescriptive jurisdiction based upon protecting
nationals injured abroad ("passive personality")), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§

402 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1987)

(relegating passive personality to a comment instead of the "black-letter" rule).
32.

RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 402 Reporters' Notes 5-10.
33. Id at§§ 407-413.
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extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. The result is somewhat
inconsistent. What was the point of providing a list of bases beyond
territorial connections under which the U.S. can and does apply its
law, only to state that courts should presume any given statute only
applies based upon a territorial connection? It cannot be international
law, since the Restatement asserts that all of the listed bases are
consistent with customary international law. Since the Restatement
asserts that all of these bases have some use in U.S. statutes
(providing examples for each), where is the evidence for a strong
presumption that Congress favors territorial connections over the
other bases, rather than simply allowing courts to decide which of the
listed bases for prescription jurisdiction fits Congress' intent for any
given statute without prejudging the matter? Moreover, even if one
assumes that Congress normally thinks in terms of territorial
connections, why was it necessary to depart from an expansive
application of the list of possible territorial connections (status,
conduct, and effects) that the Restatement lays out as permissible
bases for prescriptive jurisdiction?
There is also the question of what the presumption against
extraterritoriality has to do with Foreign Relations Law. As just
stated, according to the Restatement, international law does not
compel the presumption. The desire to avoid conflicts resulting from
overlapping claims to prescriptive jurisdiction allowed under
international law is certainly a legitimate foreign relations concern.
Indeed, the Third Restatement's famous Section 403 sought to limit
the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in order to avoid such
conflicts. The notion that the presumption against extraterritoriality
will curb such conflicts, however, flies in the face of experience.
Some of the most noted objections by other nations to the application
of U.S. laws have arisen out of the application of U.S. law based upon
either conduct 34 or effectS 35 within the United States. Moreover,

Justice Scalia's opinion in the pivotal Morrison decision justifies the
presumption against extraterritoriality based upon Congress being

34. Indeed, the so-called "F-cubed" (foreign plaintiff, foreign defendant, foreign
transaction) cases brought under Section 10(b), which had provoked the objecting foreign
government amicus briefs in Morrison, were based upon the presence of some fraudulent
conduct in the United States. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions
Under Federal Securities Law: ManagingJurisdictionalConflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRAN SNAT' L
L. 14, 24, 61-64 (2007).
35. E.g., Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the ExtraterritorialReach of US. Law, 24
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 32-33 (1993) (discussing foreign government protests and
retaliation against application of U.S. antitrust law based upon the effects test).
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interested primarily in domestic issues rather than upon avoiding
conflict with other nations' laws.3 6
In the end, one suspects that the only reason the Restatement
included the presumption against extraterritoriality is because of
Supreme Court decisions invoking the presumption and the pragmatic
view that it would be confusing to ignore the presumption based upon
a technical argument that it does not involve Foreign Relations Law.
III. UNHELPFUL AT THE EDGES: ADDRESSING THE ISSUES RAISED BY
THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Having incorporated the Supreme Court's renewed infatuation
with the presumption against extraterritoriality, the drafters of the
Fourth Restatement faced various questions raised by implementing
the presumption.
A.

What Is Extraterritorial?

In a world of global interactions in which events potentially
triggering U.S. law often straddle national borders, an increasingly
critical inquiry in applying the presumption against extraterritoriality
is to determine whether a particular application of U.S. law would
indeed be extraterritorial. 37 It is therefore unfortunate that the Fourth
Restatement largely missed the opportunity to provide real guidance
on the question.
The Fourth Restatement initially addresses the question in
Reporters' Note 1 to Section 402. Note 1 points out the different
meanings attached to the term "extraterritorial." At the narrow
extreme, Note 1 explains how some sources use the term to refer to a
situation in which a nation asserts prescriptive jurisdiction based upon
something other than a territorial connection (probably because the
situation lacks any territorial connection with the nation). At the
broad extreme, Note 1 points out how other sources use the term to
refer to a situation in which a nation asserts prescriptive jurisdiction
based upon a territorial connection, but under circumstances that also
touch the territory of another nation. Note 1, however, fails to explore
the potential justification for either definition, instead expressing a
short-lived intent to stay away from the terminology.

36. Morrison v. Austl. Nat'1 Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
37. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Determining Extraterritoriality,56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 341 (2014); Aaron D. Simowitz, Extraterritorialityin the Funhouse Mirror, 50 Conn. L.
Rev. _ (forthcoming 2019).

456

WILLAMETTE LAWREVIEW

[55:449

In fact, both of these definitions might be useful depending upon
why one is asking whether there is extraterritoriality. The narrow
definition is relevant if one assumes that Congress normally thinks in
terms of territorial connections-rather than the nationality of the
parties or the other non-territorial bases for prescriptive jurisdiction
listed by the Restatement-as the predicate for the application of its
statutes. The broad definition is relevant if one is concerned about
overlapping claims by different nations to prescriptive jurisdiction
based upon territoriality.
The Fourth Restatement's intent to stay away from the term
"extraterritorial" is, of course, short-lived by the necessity of dealing
with the presumption against extraterritoriality. Comment c to Section
404 of the Fourth Restatement ignores both interpretations of
"extraterritorial" discussed in Reporters' Note 1 to Section 402.
Instead, Comment c states that whether the application of a statute is
domestic or extraterritorial depends upon where whatever is the
"focus" of the statutory provision at issue occurred. If it occurred
inside the United States, the application is domestic and the
presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply; if it occurred
outside the United States, the application is extraterritorial and the
presumption is triggered.
This focus test comes from the Supreme Court's Morrison
decision. There, the Court confronted a situation in which the
plaintiffs argued that, even though they purchased their stock at an
inflated price in Australia, the case did not involve extraterritoriality
38
because the fraud inflating the price originated in Florida. in
response, the Court held that extraterritoriality depends upon which
event constitutes the focus of the statute. 39 The Court then held that
the focus of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 40 -which,
broadly speaking, prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security-is the purchase or sale rather than the fraud, and so
the location of the sale, rather than the fraud, dictates
extraterritoriality. 4 1
Yet, if statutory focus provides the test for determining whether
the situation involves extraterritoriality, what is the test for
determining the statutory focus? Take the classic example asking
whose law against murder should apply when a shooter stands on one
38. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.
39. Id.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
41. Morrison,561 U.S. at266.
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side of a nation's border while the victim stands on the other side. Is
the focus of the law against murder the act of pulling the trigger with
intent to kill, or is it the fatal impact of the bullet striking the victim?
How on earth is a court supposed to figure out the answer to such a
question?
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court opinions applying the focus
test provide no useful guidance. In Morrison, the Court concluded
that the focus of Section 10(b) is the sale, not the fraud, based upon
five fairly conventional statutory interpretation arguments purporting
to show that Congress did not intend to regulate overseas sales of
securities. 42 Whle the five specific arguments the Court made were
rather poor, 4 3 there is a more fundamental problem with this
approach: If the court can determine based upon the normal tools of
statutory construction that Congress did not intend for a statute to
apply to certain overseas events, there is no purpose invoking the
presumption against extraterritoriality in order to determine Congress'
intent. In other words, Morrison simply engaged in an exercise in
circular reasoning under which the court determined that Congress
did not intend the statute to apply to overseas sales as a predicate for
invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality when dealing with
overseas sales.
At the other extreme, the Supreme Court in RJR Nabisco v.
European Community,
concluded that the section providing a
private cause of action for persons injured by a violation of RICO 45
only applies if the injury occurs in the United States.4 6 Presumably,
this reflects an implicit conclusion that the focus of RICO's private
cause of action section is the injury rather than the violation. Yet, the
court never bothers to explain why this should be so. True, one
purpose of a private cause of action provision is obviously to
compensate for injuries. However, Congress did not intend to
compensate for any injuries, but only those caused by a violation of
RICO's substantive provisions. Moreover, RICO's private cause of

42. For an extended discussion of these arguments, see Franklin A. Gevurtz,
Symposium: TransnationalSecurities and Regulatory Litigation in the Aftermath of Morrison
v. Australia National Bank: An Introduction to the Symposium and an Examination of
Morrison's Impact on the PresumptionAgainst Extraterritoriality,27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB.

Bus. & DEVEL. L.J. 173, 191-94 (2014).
43. Id.
44. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
46. RJR Nabisco v. European Cmty, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016).
47. The Court never actually comes out and says this.
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action provision calls for awarding treble damages. 4 8 This shows that
Congress' goal for allowing private claims was as much or more to
deter violations of RICO's substantive provisions, as it was to
compensate for injuries. Hence, it is not at all self-evident that the
injury rather than substantive violation is the focus of Congress'
concern in this section.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's most recent foray into applying the
focus test (WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.49) magically
flipped RJR Nabisco and decided that when it comes to patent cases
the focus of the section allowing parties to recover damages from
patent infringement is the infringement rather than the damages. Go
figure.
The bottom line from this troika of decisions is that the Supreme
Court's application of its focus test either requires a determination
that Congress does not wish the statute to apply unless a particular
event occurs inside the United States-in which case the presumption
against extraterritoriality is redundant-or else simply becomes an
ipsa dixit that decrees one way for one statute and 180 degrees the
opposite way for another.
Seen in this light, it is unfortunate that the Fourth Restatement
largely punts when it comes to guidance for determining the statutory
focus. Comment c ignores the question. Instead, the Restatement only
attempts some discussion in Reporters' Notes 8 and 9 to Section 404.
Note 8 contains a general discussion of judicial authority
concerning the focus test. One problematic aspect of this Note is its
citation to decisions that predate Morrison's adoption of the test.
Morrison itself only cites the Supreme Court's earlier decisions
dealing with overseas employment (ARAMCO and Foley Bros. v.
5 o) as precedent for the test.5 1 Yet, both of these decisions
Folardo
simply assumed the situation before them involved extraterritoriality
rather than asking what was, and what was not, the focus of the
statute.5 2
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
49. 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2138 (2018).
50. Foley Bros v. Folardo, 366 U.S. 281 (1949); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.
(ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
51. Morrison v. Austl. Nat'l Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
52. See, e.g., Gevurtz, supra note 37, at 371 (discussing the "domestic focus" language
in ARAMCO and the lack of consideration in that opinion as to whether there was
extraterritoriality). Foley explored no other territorial connection to the United States of the
work performed overseas allegedly in violation of a U.S. statute prohibiting working more
than 8 hours per day on contracts with the U.S. government.
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In any event, the first and third paragraphs of Note 8 simply
repeat the basic approach under which the focus of the statute
determines whether the situation involves extraterritoriality. The only
effort in these paragraphs to address how courts are to determine a
statute's focus is a quotation from the Supreme Court's old Bowman
decision,5 3 which long predates the focus test, and which, as the
Reporters' Notes recognize elsewhere, 54 is probably a case best
explained as an application of prescriptive jurisdiction based upon
protecting critical government functions rather than territoriality. The
middle paragraph of Note 8 helpfully gives examples of various foci
statutes might have-conduct, transactions, or injury-but provides
no clue as to how the court should figure out which is the focus for a
particular statute.
The best the drafters attempt to answer this question comes in
the second paragraph of Note 9-the first paragraph of which deals
with RJR Nabisco's piecemeal application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality. The second paragraph states that the focus of a
statutory provision might be indicated by its text or by looking at the
focus of the statute as a whole. Whether intentionally or not, this is
just being ironic. The paragraph cites Morrison as looking to the
statute as a whole in order to determine its focus. Indeed, among the
arguments the Supreme Court makes in Morrison for concluding that
Section 10(b) focuses on sales rather than fraud is its placement in a
statute the overarching purpose of which is to regulate U.S. stock
markets.55 Of course, this ignores the language in Section 10(b) itself,
which speaks specifically of manipulative or deceptive acts or
contrivances, rather than anything else, in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. By contrast, Note 9 cites RJR Nabisco
as looking to the language of the statutory provision at issue-which
establishes a private cause of action for persons injured in their
business or property by a RICO violation-as showing a focus on the
injury. But this ignores the placement of this private cause of action
provision in a broader statute (RICO) whose overarching purpose, as
encapsulated in the statute's title, 56 is to punish those who acquire or
engage in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activities.

53.

United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922).

54.

RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 404 Reporters' Note 10 (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
55. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267.
56. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
1961-1968 (1970).
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In its recent foray applying the focus test in WesternGeco,57 the
Supreme Court pretends to look at both. This case involved an effort
to collect lost overseas profits under a section of the Patent Act
entitling the holder of an infringed patent to collect "damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement." 5 8 In ruling that the
focus of the section is the infringement, rather than the damages, the
Court began by stating that it must look at the section in the context of
the rest of the statute. 59 This, however, raises the obvious question as
to why RJR Nabisco did not do the same in dealing with RICO's
private cause of action section. The Court's answer does not point to
anything in the rest of the Patent Act to explain the difference.
Instead, it tries to conjure up a pair of arguments based upon the
language of the damages provision itself.60 One is to draw a
difference between damages and injury. For those who thought the
two terms largely synonymous, 6 1 the Court states that RICO's private
cause of action provision creates a substantive element requiring the
plaintiff to prove it suffered injury. Yet, to collect lost profits under
the Patent Act, the patent holder must prove the infringement caused
them. 62
Ultimately, the Reporters' Notes might have been more honest in
restating the Supreme Court's approach by saying that the Court will
look to whatever it wants about the statute, no matter how
inconsistent with the approach in other decisions, in order to get the
result the Court sought before it looked at the statute. In a new
paper, 63 William Dodge, Reporter for the Fourth Restatement on this
57. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 284. The infringement in the case consisted of making components in
the United States for a patented ocean floor surveying system and shipping the components for
assembly outside of the United States. To prevent circumvention of the Patent Act, the Act's
section defining infringement (id. at § 271) includes manufacturing components in the United
States for assembly outside the country into items covered by U.S. patents. The problem in the
case came from the nature of the plaintiffs damages. Commonly, the patent holder could
claim damages arising in the United States from the loss of export sales that the patent holder
would have made to the parties who instead purchased the competing product assembled
abroad. WesternGeco, however, did not sell its ocean floor survey system but instead used the
system to conduct ocean floor surveys. This meant that instead of lost export sales,
WestemGeco lost contracts for ocean floor surveys outside of the United States, making its
damages presumably extraterritorial. See id.
59. WesternGeco LLC, 138 S. Ct. at 2137.
60. Id. at 2138.
61. Damage,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

THESAURUS,

https://www.merriam-

webster.com/thesaurus/damage (last visited June 29, 2018).
62. E.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc.,
699 F.3d 1340, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
63. William S. Dodge, The New Presumption againstExtraterritoriality,133 HARV. L.
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topic, tries to turn this lemon into lemonade by applauding the
flexibility that the focus test gives the Court. If the competing choice
is a mechanical determination of extraterritoriality solely by the
location of the defendant's conduct, 64 then there may be something to
be said for such flexibility. However, U.S. courts had long since
moved past the view that the only territorial connection justifying
application of a statute is the location of the defendant's conduct,
and it not clear that ARAMCO, which never considered the issue of
what is extraterritorial, 6 6 meant to change that. If, however, flexibility
means a license for the Supreme Court to reach results-oriented
outcomes following a Kabuki dance that obscures the real reasons
behind the Court's decisions, then I am not so sure flexibility is such a
good thing.
Maybe the nature of a Restatement precludes setting forth an
alternative to the focus test-albeit the Supreme Court itself
suggested it might look to something different in its Kiobel decision,
where it talked about whether claims "touch and concern" the
territory of the United States "with sufficient force" to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality. 67 Even if stuck with the focus
test, perhaps the Restatement could have attempted to nudge the
Court into using the test in a transparent manner based upon criteria
relevant
to the goals behind the presumption
against
extraterritoriality. Specifically, while the circularity of the Morrison
decision was maddening, and the Court's specific statutory
construction arguments embarrassingly poor, the Court's effort to
address whether Congress wanted to regulate fraud in connection with
overseas sales of securities at least asked the right question. Indeed, in
retrospect, Morrison starts to look a lot better when one compares it
to the ipse dixit, inconsistent reasoning employed in RJR Nabisco and
WesternGeco. Moreover, a sensible approach could include testing
various claimed foci by asking if it would advance Congress's
purpose behind the legislation if the statute applies when an asserted

REv. _ (forthcoming 2020).
64. See, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality'sFifth Business, 61
VAND. L. REv. 1455, 1478-82 (2008) (arguing against effects test).
65. See e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),
148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (applying the Sherman Act based upon effects in the United
States); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1968) (applying Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act based upon effects in the United States).
66. See Gevurtz supra note 37.
67. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124-125 (2013).
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focus occurs outside the United States. Beyond such legislative
purpose analysis, and even better when viewed from the standpoint of
concerns central to foreign relations law, the Restatement could have
suggested that courts openly import into the focus test considerations
of comity. Of course, we have now reintroduced the better features of
68
the Second Circuit's pre-Morrison conduct and effects test, but so
long as this does not devolve into a case-by-case approach, who is to
notice?
B.

Rebutting the Presumption

The Fourth Restatement takes a more assertive posture when it
comes to rebutting the presumption against extraterritoriality. While
bowing to obvious necessity by using the word "clear" when
describing the indication of Congressional intent necessary to
overcome the presumption, the Fourth Restatement takes pains to
state that the presumption is not a clear statement rule and that the
69
Court will look at all evidence to determine Congress's intent.
Even here, however, the Restatement missed an opportunity for a
further clarification. Specifically, the Restatement is rather oblique
regarding the relationship between its typography for prescriptive
jurisdiction and rebutting the presumption. Conceptually, there are
two essential ways in which to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality. The more obvious is a reference by the statute to
events outside the United States. The subtler would be a reference by
the statute to one of the non-territorial bases for asserting prescriptive
jurisdiction listed by the Restatement (nationality of the person
regulated, nationality of a victim, protection of government
functioning, or universal).7 0 Can a statute's reference to a possible
non-territorial basis for prescriptive jurisdiction rebut the presumption
against extraterritoriality in the absence of any language addressing
the relevance of territoriality?
Take, for example, a statute that would require U.S. citizens to
vote in federal elections. Would this apply to U.S. citizens when
outside the country? The answer is easy if the statute specifically
states that it will apply even when the U.S. citizen is outside the

68. See, e.g., Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London,
147 F.3d 118, 129-31 (2d Cir. 1998).
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

69.

STATES

§ 404 cmt.

70.

STATES at

b (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
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§ 404.
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United States (as the case in a number of the examples cited in the
Reporters' Note 7 to Section 402). Suppose, however, the statute does
not contain such a geographic reference: How important is it that the
statute includes language opening the possibility of a non-territorial
basis for prescriptive jurisdiction (nationality of the party regulated)?
If such language cannot rebut the presumption on its own, can it at
least provide a foot in the door that frees the court to explore a more
policy oriented or nuanced analysis of whether the presumption is
rebutted? In addition to statutes referring to the nationality of
perpetrators or victims, the question also arises with statutes
prohibiting conduct commonly subject to universal jurisdiction.
Perhaps this what the drafters meant when referring to
"nongeographic provisions" in Reporters' Note 10 to Section 404.71
Unfortunately, the terse explanation for this term, its placement well
separated from the discussion of rebutting the presumption against
extraterritoriality, 72 and its muddy history in the drafting process, 73
render this meaning not entirely clear.
C.

The Chicken or the Egg

Reporters' Note 6 to Section 404 points out that the Supreme
Court expressed a preference in RJR Nabisco for first addressing
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality is rebutted and
then considering whether the situation involves extraterritoriality
under the focus test. 74 The note closes, however, with the reassurance
that RJR Nabisco does not bar courts from proceeding in the opposite
order and, indeed, the Supreme Court in WesternGeco reversed the
order when considering the Patent Act's damages provision. 75

71.
72.
73.

Id. at Reporters' Note 10.
Id. at Reporters' Note 7.
Earlier drafts had referred to provisions that have a "non-geographic" "focus".

RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:

JURISDICTION § 203, Reporters' Note 10 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017). This confuses the
question of whether the situation is extraterritorial with rebutting the presumption against
extraterritoriality and further confuses the term focus. In fact, few statutes have a geographic
focus (except for a statute creating a national park). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, according to the Supreme Court in Morrison, focuses on the sale of securities. RICO's
private cause of action provision, according to the Supreme Court in RJR Nabisco, focuses on
injuries. The Patent Act's damages provision, according to the Supreme Court in
WesternGeco, focuses on infringement. In other words, statutes normally address (or "focus"
on if we must use this term) conduct and consequences rather than places.
74.

RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 404, Reporters' Note 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
75. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136-38 (2018).
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Reporters' Note 6 might have gone further to point out that RJR
Nabisco's preferred order can actually cause confusion, as illustrated
in RJR Nabisco itself. The issue of RICO's extraterritorial application
ended up before the Supreme Court due to a split among lower courts
over whether the focus of RICO's prohibition on conducting an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activities1 6 is the
enterprise or the racketeering activities. 77 The Court in RJR Nabisco
believed it mooted this question by finding that Congress intended
RICO to apply extraterritorially, at least as to certain racketeering
78
activities. This, however, is wrong, as the Court would have realized
had it reversed the order of its inquiries.
The key evidence of Congressional intent regarding
extraterritoriality and RICO was that a number of the illegal actions
listed as racketeering activities under RICO were prohibited by
statutes that showed Congress intended to reach those actions even
when they occurred outside the United States. 79 The Supreme Court
held that this rebutted the presumption against extraterritoriality for
RICO's substantive prohibition, at least for those actions.so This is
only true, however, if racketeering activities are RICO's focus. If, on
the other hand, the enterprise conducted through the pattern of
racketeering activities is the focus, then this conclusion does not
follow, since, in this event, it is the location of the enterprise, rather

76. In other words, repeated actions that violate certain other Federal criminal statutes.
77. Compare United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2013)
(racketeering activities are RICO's focus), with Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1350
(S.D. Fla. 2012) (enterprise is RICO's focus). The Supreme Court in RJR Nabisco pretended
otherwise when it suggested that the split was over whether RICO applied extraterritorially.
RJR Nabisco v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2099 (2016). The lower courts, however,
were in general agreement that RICO did not apply extraterritorially. E.g., Chao Fan Xu, 706
F.3d at 974, 979; Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir.
2010). True, the Second Circuit in RJR Nabisco had created an exception for specific crimes
listed as racketeering activities when the statutes prohibiting those crimes evidenced clear
intent to apply extraterritorially, but no other circuit said this was wrong.
78. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2103-04. In addition to asserting that it mooted the
relevance of the enterprise's location by finding the presumption against extraterritoriality
rebutted, the Court makes two policy arguments against limiting RICO to domestic
enterprises: one being the undesirable outcome resulting from saying that RICO cannot apply
if a foreign enterprise engages in racketeering in the United States and the other being the
difficulty of locating the enterprise in many cases. These sorts of policy arguments, however,
run up against Morrison's rejection of such considerations in applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
79. Id. at 2102 (giving the example of one of the crimes listed as racketeering under
RICO, killing a U.S. national while outside the United States, that could only apply to conduct
outside the United States).
80. Id.
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than the location of the racketeering activities, that matters. In other
words, if the enterprise is RICO's focus, then Congress' inclusion of
racketeering activities that might occur abroad says nothing about
Congress' intent regarding extraterritorial application of RICO, since
the location of something that is not the statute's focus is irrelevant in
any event.
Of course, given the difficulties inherent in the focus test, it is
understandable that the Supreme Court would wish to avoid the test
until convinced that the presumption of extraterritoriality applies to
the statute. Nevertheless, Congress's intent to apply the statute to
overseas conduct that would not render the statute's application
extraterritorial under the focus test tells us nothing that would rebut
the presumption against extraterritoriality. Hence, the need to often
identify the statute's focus first is the inevitable consequence of an
approach that renders only certain territorial connections relevant and
others irrelevant to determining extraterritoriality.
D.

Slicing andDicing

The Fourth Restatement also addresses in a Reporters' Note
another impact of RJR Nabisco on the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
This involves whether to evaluate the
extraterritorial application of a statute as a whole or for particular
pieces and, if looking at individual pieces, how small are the pieces.
Reporters' Note 9 to Section 404 follows RJR Nabisco's piecemeal
approach in stating that a statute might have some provisions that
apply extraterritorially and some that do not.8 1
Once again, however, the Restatement misses an important
opportunity: in this instance, to clarify when and where a court should
divide up a statute in determining its extraterritorial application. RJR
Nabisco illustrates the problem. The plaintiff in RJR Nabisco needed
to establish three elements: (1) the defendants engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activities; 82 (2) the defendants acquired, invested in, or
operated an enterprise through this pattern of racketeering activities; 83
and (3) the plaintiff was injured in its business or property as a
result. 84 The Court broke up the first element, holding that the
presumption against extraterritoriality was rebutted for some
81.

RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS

STATES § 404, Reporters' Note 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-19).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
84. Id. at § 1964(c).
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racketeering activities, but not others.8 5 The Court then applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality separately to last element, both
with respect to whether the presumption was rebutted and with
86
respect to the focus of RICO's private cause of action provision. At
the same time, the Court did not apply the presumption separately to
the enterprise and racketeering elements of RICO

7

and thereby did

not throw out the case because the enterprise was located in Europe.
no overarching
RJR Nabisco provides
Unfortunately,
explanation as to when and where the court will divide statutory
provisions in applying the presumption against extraterritoriality and
when and where it will not.8 8 This is not an insignificant concern,
since the more the court divides statutory provisions in applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality, the narrower the jurisdictional
reach of the statute. For example, applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality separately to a private cause of action provision and
to the substantive statutory violation provision that triggers the private
cause of action, as in RJR Nabisco, effectively gives defendants two
bites at hiding behind extraterritoriality-one for whether the
presumption against extraterritoriality blocks the substantive violation
(presumably based upon the focus of the substantive violation
provision) and a second based upon the location of the injury. Indeed,
such separate treatment of pieces of the same statute could allow the
defendant in the cross-border shooting example to literally get away
with murder. 89 Seen in this light, it would have been helpful for the
Restatement to suggest guidelines for when statutory provisions will
be treated separately and when lumped together in applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
In one instance, the Restatement does provide such a guideline.
Reporters' Note 10 to Section 404 cites lower court decisions for the
proposition that ancillary crimes (attempt, aiding and abetting, and
85. RJR Nabisco v. European Cmty, 136 S. Ct. 2090, at 2102-03 (2016).
86. Id. at 2106-11.
87. Id. at 2103-04.
88. As noted earlier, the Court made a pair policy argument against limiting RICO to
domestic enterprises. These arguments, however, fail to provide a principled, as opposed to a
results-oriented, basis for determining when and where to separately consider statutory
provisions and they do not explain why the Court separately considered the private cause of
action provision.
89. If a statute prohibits shooting another person and provides a private cause of action
for the victim, and the court separately applies the presumption against to extraterritoriality to
both the defendant's conduct and the injury, the victim in the cross border shooting can never
recover from the shooter because the statute does not prohibit the shooting if the shooter is
across the border and only provides recovery when the victim was in the nation when shot.
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conspiracy) track the territorial reach (or geographic scope in the
Restatement's preferred terminology) of the underlying crime: In
other words, whether the presumption against extraterritoriality is
rebutted for the ancillary crime depends on whether it is rebutted for
the underlying crime and the focus of the statute prohibiting the
ancillary crime is the same as the focus of the statute prohibiting the
underlying crime. While this seems sensible, the Reporters' Note
might be more persuasive (should the question ever end up in the
Supreme Court) if the Note explained why the treatment of the private
cause of action in RJR Nabisco followed a different rule.
E.

The Impact ofExecutive Branch Action

A results-oriented explanation for the Supreme Court's decisions
in Morrison, Kiobel and RJR Nabisco is that they reflect hostility
toward private claims by foreign parties arising out of events
occurring abroad. On a gut level, a number of Supreme Court justices
seem determined to prevent Federal courts from turning into a
"Shangri La" 90 for entrepreneurial attorneys and foreign parties who
are forum shopping for substantive and procedural laws more
conducive to private actions than available in their home countries.
This suggests there may be different outcomes in applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality when dealing with criminal
prosecutions or other actions brought or supported by executive
branch agencies.91
In one of its more proactive portions, the Fourth Restatement
pushes back hard against such a distinction. Specifically, Comment d
to Section 402 and Reporters' Notes 4 to Section 402 and 4 to Section
404 generally reject the idea that prescriptive jurisdiction and the
presumption against extraterritoriality apply differently to criminal
versus civil actions or to public versus private plaintiffs. This might
have been more persuasive, however, if the Restatement addressed
three things:
First, the Restatement could have more forthrightly addressed
Supreme Court decisions that effectively allow public prosecutions to
proceed, but throw up an extraterritoriality barrier to private actions.
This occurred in both RJR Nabisco and the Supreme Court's earlier

90. Morrison v. Austl. Nat'l Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 270 (2010).
91. It also explains why the Court was more sympathetic to the plaintiff-a U.S.
company that lost overseas business to a party infringing on its U.S. patent-in WesternGeco
LLC
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decision in F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran S.A. 92 RJR Nabisco's
separate treatment of RICO's private cause of action provision places
an extraterritoriality hurdle (that the injury occur in the United States)
for claims by private parties, 93 which government prosecutions under
RICO do not confront. While Empagran did not invoke the
presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court interpreted the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 94 to block claims by
foreign parties who bought vitamins overseas at prices inflated by a
worldwide cartel that included U.S. companies. A major reason for
doing so was to accommodate other nations' hostility toward private
antitrust claims.9 5
Next, Reporters' Notes 4 to Section 402 and 4 to Section 404
mention Congressional legislation that draws a distinction between
public and private actions. Specifically, in a hastily added section of
the Dodd-Frank Act, 96 Congress sought to reverse Morrison when it
came to government actions, but directed the SEC to further study
what the rule should be for private actions. The Notes do not ask,
however, whether this legislation evidences an overall attitude by
Congress looking more favorably upon government prosecutions than
private actions when it comes to the geographic scope of legislation
generally. Of course, such a reading might be seeing more than there
is to see in this one provision, but it might have been helpful to
explicitly address the temptation of a court to read this Congressional
action as more broadly indicative of Congressional attitudes.
Finally, the Restatement fails to address the policy issues raised
by the distinction. In fact, some argue that there should be a greater
willingness to limit extraterritorial application of statutes when
dealing with criminal, as opposed to civil, actions. 97 This reflects the
notion that there should be fair notice before prosecuting conduct the
defendant might not have realized was illegal-in this instance because
the defendant did not realize U.S. law would apply. This is a rationale
behind the presumption in favor of lenity when dealing with

92. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
93. Including foreign governments, such as the European Union.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-19).
95. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 167-68.
96. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 929P(b), 929Y(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
97. Julie R. O'Sullivan, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Federal CriminalStatutes:
Analytical Roadmap, Normative Conclusions, and a Plea to Congress for Direction, 106 GEO.
L.J. 1021 (2018).
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ambiguous criminal statutes. 98 The persuasiveness of this argument
might depend upon how different the U.S. law is from other nations'
prohibitions. It might also depend upon whether one is dealing with
individual or corporate defendants, since there may be little practical
difference between imposing a fine on a corporation and making the
corporation liable for monetary damages in a civil action.
By contrast, Empagran and RJR Nabisco advance policy
arguments going in the other direction. As stated above, Empagran
was concerned with other nations' opposition to a "private attorney
general" approach toward enforcing public laws, so that even when
there is convergence among nations condemning the conduct at issue,
there is divergence with respect to a private remedy. Avoiding such
conflicts in law and policy is one rationale sometimes expressed for
the presumption against extraterritoriality. 99 RJR Nabisco shares
Empagran's concerns,100 but also invokes the rationale that private
parties will not take into account international relations concerns in
deciding whether to bring a lawsuit, as presumably would government
prosecutors.10 1 Indeed, this sort of superiority of the Executive rather
than the Judicial branch when it comes to legal actions having a
potentially negative impact on foreign relations is another rationale
sometimes advanced in support of the presumption against
extraterritoriality.1 02
While not specifically involving a distinction between private
actions andgovernment prosecutions, the Fourth Restatement itself
suggests deference to Executive branch determinations regarding
federal statutes and extraterritoriality. Specifically, Comment e to
Section 404 calls for applying Chevron and Skidmore deference to
agency determinations regarding the geographic scope of federal
statutes if such determinations would otherwise be entitled to
deference under Chevron and Skidmore. The arguable policy tension
between this position and the Restatement's categorical rejection of a
difference between private actions and public prosecutions in
evaluating extraterritoriality seems to have escaped the drafters'
attention. While decisions to prosecute a given case might not fall
within the literal confines of Chevron and Skidmore, a similar

98.
E.g., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
99.
E.g., ARAMCO, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
100. RJR Nabisco v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106-07 (2016).
101. Id. at 2106, 2108.
102. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'LL. 505, 516 (1997).
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deference to the executive branch when considering the foreign policy
impact of applying U.S. law might seem to apply at least to some
extent in either case.
F.

Second Bites at the Apple

Finally, in another more proactive reaction to the presumption
against extraterritoriality, the Fourth Restatement leaves open the
possibility that courts may further curtail application of U.S. law to
events outside the United States even when not blocked by the
presumption. Specifically, under the heading "Reasonableness in
Interpretation," Section 405 of the Fourth Restatement announces that
courts, as a matter of prescriptive comity, may interpret statutes to
include other limitations on their reach. Reinforcing the cumulative
nature of this power, Comment c to Section 405 explains that the
presumption against extraterritoriality does not preclude courts from
also interpreting a statute to contain other limitations based upon
comity.
The fundamental problem with this approach is that it creates a
one-way ratchet effect in which a hard-edged presumption against
extraterritoriality can cut off claims that a more nuanced statutory
interpretation based upon reasonableness might have allowed, but, if a
plaintiff overcomes the presumption, defendants might still persuade
a court to decline application of U.S. law based upon more nuanced
considerations of comity. Of course, a cynical view might say that
this perfectly captures (or restates) the pro-corporate-defendant view
of a majority of the Supreme Court. From a balanced policy
perspective, however, the result seems questionable.
While Section 405 traces its linage to famous Section 403 of the
Third Restatement,1 03 it is important to recognize the critical
contextual difference between the two sections resulting from the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Section 403 in the Third
Restatement exists as the matching piece for Section 402's broadly
permissive enumeration of acceptable bases for prescriptive
jurisdiction. The overlapping claims to prescriptive jurisdiction
stemming from Section 402's expansive approach creates the obvious
potential for clash. Section 403 addresses this potential through a set
of mutually applicable factors for self-restraint, influenced by modem

103.

STATES
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Reporters' Note 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
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choice of law rules,1 04 which both nations should apply in the case of
such overlap.' 0 5

This sort of approach to prescriptive jurisdiction tracked and
influenced the pre-Morrison decisions of lower Federal courts
applying the so-called "conduct and effects" test to the reach of
various Federal statutes, such as Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act. These decisions paired a ready willingness to find a
territorial connection based upon any substantial conduct or effect
within the United States, with a more particularized determination of
whether it would be consistent with Congressional intent and
concerns of comity to apply the statute to the situation at hand. 106 The
Third Restatement's approach also drew upon the Timberland line of
cases,10 7 which applied a comity analysis to temper the otherwise
broad application of U.S. antitrust laws based upon effects in the
United States.
By contrast, Section 405 exists in a very different context
resulting from Section 404's restatement the presumption against
extraterritoriality. This moves the baseline for applying a statute prior
to considerations of comity from the liberality of Section 402 to the
hostility of the presumption against extraterritoriality. The drafters of
the Fourth Restatement recognize part of the difference when they
explain that the presumption against extraterritoriality might render
further consideration of comity unnecessary10 8 and warn against
double counting such considerations.' 09 The problem, however, goes
deeper. It lies in an unjustified asymmetry when dealing with the
advantages and disadvantages of bright line rules versus more
nuanced analysis.
Central to Morrison's rejection of the conduct and effects test
was the Court's view that the test was too uncertain in its
application." 0 Hence, its replacement by the presumption against
104.

E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 403 Reporters' Note 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
105.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 402 cmt. b.
106. See, e.g., Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London,
147 F.3d 118, 129-31 (2d Cir. 1998).
107. E.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 614 & note 31
(9th Cir. 1976); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir.
1979).
108.

RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

405 Reporters' Note 4.
109. Id. at cmt c.
110. Morrison v. Austl. Nat'l Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 258-61 (2010).
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extraterritoriality implemented through a demanding (clear indication)
standard for rebuttal and a focus test under which extraterritoriality is
determined by the location of one particular thing for the statutory
provision. The hoped-for advantage in terms of certainty from the
rigid presumption, however, comes at the cost of courts not applying
Federal statutes in situations in which a more nuanced evaluation
could have shown such application to advance Congressional
purposes and not interfered with concerns of comity.
By stating that courts may decline to apply a statute based upon
more nuanced considerations of reasonableness, even when not
blocked by the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Fourth
Restatement reintroduces uncertainty. True, this is not necessarily the
extreme case-by-case uncertainty of the former Section 403,"' but it
still opens up the prospects for added considerations whose relevance
will only become visible in hindsight. The Second Circuit's
Parkcentraldecisionl2-- cited in Reporters' Note 4 to Section 405illustrates. By holding that Morrison's location of the sale test
provides a necessary, but not a sufficient, predicate for application of
Section 10(b), the court in Parkcentralwas able to rule that Section
10(b) did not apply to sales of securities (swap contracts" 3) in the
United States, when the value of those contracts depended upon the
price of stock traded in foreign markets. The result is not only to
surprise those who thought that, under Morrison, Section 10(b)
protected them when engaging in the purchase or sale of a security in
the United States, but also to open up the door for particularized
inquiry into the nature of complex securities transactions going
beyond simply the question of where the purchase or sale occurred.
At the same time, the offsetting advantage of Section 405 flows
in only one direction: allowing a more nuanced evaluation to stop
application of the statute in situations in which such an evaluation
shows the presumption is insufficient to protect comity. By contrast,
situations in which a more nuanced evaluation would show that
Congressional objectives for the statute would be achieved without
damage to comity by applying the statute, or even that foreign
relations concerns counsel in favor of applying the statute, 114 will not
111. William S. Dodge, Reasonableness in the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign
Relations Law, 55 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 521 (2019).
112. Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 216 (2d
Cir. 2014).
113. If not securities themselves, such contracts constitute a purchase or sale of the
underlying securities.
114. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 37, at 400-04 (discussing instances in which comity
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be captured. This sort of asymmetry cannot be justified unless one
assumes a parallel asymmetry in the consequences of uncertainty
regarding application of a statute or in the consequences of a mistaken
over- versus under-application of the statute. Nothing in the Fourth
Restatement explains why this is so.
Nor does the bulk of existing judicial authority command this
result. Except for Parkcentral, the judicial authorities cited in the
Reporters' Notes to Section 405 involve statutes to which the
Supreme Court has not applied the presumption against
extraterritoriality, and particularly the focus test, in the postARAMCO/Morrison era.11 5 Hence, these authorities are consistent
with complementing expansive approaches to extraterritorial
application with more particularized evaluation of comity
considerations, as embodied in the Third Restatement, but they do not
involve a one-sided piling of additional particularized evaluation on
top of Morrison's effort at a simpler approach.
IV. CONCLUSION

A Secretary of Defense once infamously stated, "You go to war
with the army you have."1 16 Similarly, a Restatement restates the law
you have, not the law you would like to have. Hence, one
sympathizes with the challenge facing the drafters of the Fourth
Restatement when dealing with the presumption against
extraterritoriality. This leaves it to other forms of scholarship to point
out the problems with the law we have, a task to which this article has
tried to make a small contribution.
counsels in favor of applying U.S. law to arguably extraterritorial situations).
115. The Reporters' Notes to § 405 cite judicial decisions dealing with antitrust,
trademark and bankruptcy law. As mentioned earlier, see supra note 18, the Supreme Court
has taken an expansive approach to the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Empagran's invocation of comity concerns in the antitrust context came in interpreting
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act, rather than as an attempt to add a layer of
comity-based reasonableness limitations on top of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
As Reporters' Note I to § 404 points out, the Supreme Court's decision addressing the
extraterritorial reach of the U.S. trademark law (Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280
(1952)) is one of a number of pre-ARAMCO Supreme Court decisions largely ignoring the
presumption against extraterritoriality. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
extraterritorial reach of the Bankruptcy Code and the lower court decisions cited by the
Reporters' Notes are not piling their more nuanced approaches on top of a Morrison-style
presumption against extraterritoriality.
116. Wolf Blitzer Reports, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was in Kuwait to give
U.S. troops a prep talk Wednesday, but was peppered with some very pointed questions, CNN,
(Dec. 8, 2004, 04:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/12/08/
rumsfeld.kuwait/index.html.
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